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THE FAILURES OF LITIGATION AS A TOOL
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL
WELFARE POLICY
Susan V. Demers*

I.

Introduction

Since the 1960s, litigation has been used frequently by advocates
for a variety of groups seeking to establish fundamental fights, to
focus attention on serious social problems, to challenge the policies
and practices of government officials and to reform institutions.
There have been notable successes. Among the rights established

through the use of litigation have been the right to travel freely
from state to state,' the right to due process before welfare benefits
can be reduced or terminated, 2 the right to privacy 3 and the right to
reproductive choice.' Litigation has also focused attention on the
problems of the mentally ill,5 the mentally retarded, 6 battered women 7 and the homeless. 8 In addition, litigation has helped to re* B.A., New York University, Washington Square College of Arts and Sciences,
1974; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1977. From 1988 to 1994, Susan V.
Demers served as Deputy Commissioner for Legal Affairs and General Counsel of
the New York State Department of Social Services in the Administration of Governor
Mario Cuomo. From 1984 to 1988, she served as Associate Commissioner for Legal
Affairs and Deputy General Counsel. She is now a legal and policy development
consultant, living in the British Virgin Islands. The author would like to thank the
staff of the Division of Legal Affairs of the New York State Department of Social
Services for their assistance with the research for this Article.
This Article was completed in April, 1995, before the end of New York State's
legislative session and before the passage of New York State's Budget for 1995-1996.
Several of the legislative and budget proposals referred to in the Article did not become law. Some of the statistical information in this Article was provided by the staff
of the New York State Department of Social Services, and their titles and offices are
cited for identification purposes. They may no longer be serving in those positions at
the present time.
1. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
2. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337
(N.Y. 1986).
6. N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983).
7. Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165
(N.Y. App. Div. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979).
8. Callahan v. Carey, Index No. 42582/79 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1979).
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form, in significant ways, prisons,9 institutions for the mentally

retarded' ° and public housing." Litigation has been and will continue to be necessary to address issues such as these. Experience
has shown, however, that litigation is a poor vehicle for the development of social welfare policy and, in fact, can be detrimental to
the very clients whose rights and interests are ostensibly being
protected.
Momentum is building around the nation for change and new
directions in many areas of social welfare policy. The welfare reform debate is raging and, while it is still unclear what new policies
will result, it is clear that experimentation on the state and local
levels with new methods of engaging clients and delivering services
and benefits will be part of any plan to reform the welfare system.12
It remains to be seen whether this will be accomplished through
the current "waiver" process,' 3 through programmatic variations
permitted by federal statute 14 or, as some have proposed, by creating new block grants.' 5 However, welfare recipients themselves6
recognize that the system cannot continue as it presently exists.'
Families who have had interaction with the child welfare system,
advocates for children and other professionals in the field have
9. Rhem v. Malcolm, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975).
10. Carey, 706 F.2d at 971.
11. Duffy v. Longo, 616 N.Y.S.2d 760 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
12. The Clinton Administration's welfare reform proposal contains new requirements for welfare recipients to participate in work or a job search and new sanctions
for failure to do so, including the termination of benefits after two years. Work and
Responsibility Act, H.R. 4605, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
13. Pursuant to § 1115 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1990)) the
Secretary of Health and Human Services may waive various sections of the Social
Security Act in order to permit states to test different ways of delivering Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC - 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-645 (1935)) and Medicaid
benefits (42 U.S.C. §§ 1396(a)-1397(e) (1935)). Under the provisions of the Food
Stamp Act (7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1964)), the Secretary of Agriculture may waive various
provisions of the Food Stamp Act to permit states to test different ways of delivering
food stamp benefits. In October 1994, the Secretaries of Health and Human Services
and Agriculture granted to New York State a series of waivers to permit implementation of a welfare reform initiative known as Jobs FIRST.
14. Work and Responsibility Act, H.R. 4605, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
15. Under the block grant approach, welfare would cease to be an entitlement for
everyone who meets the program's eligibility requirements, and funding for the program would not increase as demand for assistance grows. The block grant approach is
included in the welfare reform plan of the Republican members of the House of Representatives, H.R. 117, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) and in the Personal Responsibility Act, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), of the Republican "Contract With
America".
16. David Whitman, et al., The Myth of Reform, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT,
Jan. f6, 1995, at 30; Isabel Wilkerson, An Intimate Look at Welfare: Women Who've
Been There, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1995, at Al.
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reached a remarkable consensus that services should be familycentered and community-based, and that removing a child from his
or her family and community should be a last resort. 7 Last year,
the Clinton Administration's proposal to reform the health care
system 18 ignited a heated and continuing debate about the need to

reduce costs' 9 and improve access to health care throughout the
nation.2" While no national plan emerged from the debate, states
and local governments continue to experiment with ways to improve services to clients 21 and reduce the proportion of their budg-

ets spent on health care for the poor and uninsured.22
The reform of each of these systems has one thing in common:

the need for state and local governments to experiment, to be innovative or, to use the current, fashionable locution, to be "entrepreneurial", in the delivery of services and benefits. However,
litigation is frequently used to halt experimentation and stifle inno17. The New York State Department of Social Services and the Office of the Decade of the Child conducted a series of "community visioning" focus groups throughout the State of New York during the spring and summer of 1994. See NEW YORK
STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, FAMILIES FOR KIDS

ASAP, (1994).

18. Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
19. National health care costs totaled $884 billion in 1993. See Cost of Health Care
in the United States is Continuing to Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1994, at 35 (quoting
officials of the Clinton Administration). In 1991, national health care costs totaled
approximately $752 billion, or 13.2 % of the Gross National Product. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN HEALTH SPENDING: AN UPDATE

(June 1993).

In New York State, the costs of the Medical Assistance (Medicaid) program for the
poor and uninsured grew to $19 billion in State Fiscal Year (SFY) 1993-94, an increase of approximately 11%. These costs represent 63% of State's total budget. Information provided by Mark Sullivan, former Budget Director, Office of Budget
Management, the New York State Department of Social Services, (Mar. 1995).
20. In 1994, almost 40 million U.S. residents lacked health insurance. Information
provided by Marjorie Geiger, New York State Health Care Reform Task Force of the
New York State Department of Health (Mar. 1995)'.
21. In 1994, the use of health maintenance organizations by New York State residents grew by almost 16%, to 4.1 million. Elizabeth McFarland, the New York State
Department of Health, Bureau of Alternative Delivery Systems. Currently, in New
York State, there are approximately 500,000 Medicaid recipients enrolled in managed
care programs and the Medicaid program is seeking to increase enrollment in managed care. Information provided by Lawrence MacArthur of the Department of Social Services, Office of Budget Management (Mar. 1995). The legislature has set a
goal for 1996 of 1.7 million recipients enrolled in Medicaid managed care. N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 364-j (McKinney 1992).
22. Between October 1, 1993 and September 30, 1994 (Federal Fiscal Year 199394), New York State made payments totaling $930.2 million to general hospitals for
care provided to the uninsured and the poor who were not enrolled in the Medicaid
program. These costs represent contributions to the "Bad Debt and Charity Pool",
and include special payments to financially distressed hospitals. Information provided
by John Sweeney, Director of the New York State Department of Social Services,
Office of Financial Management (Mar. 1995).
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vation. When litigation is used this way, it upsets the balance of
power among the three branches of government and permits
judges to usurp the role of the legislative and executive branch officials who have the responsibility for making laws and establishing
policies. In New York State, various courts have used preliminary
injunctions, without rendering decisions on the merits of the underlying substantive legal claims, to micro-manage the social services
system, thereby implementing their own or a litigant's vision of
public policy, rather than those of the legislature or executive
agency officials. A courtroom is the wrong forum for a vigorous
and vital debate on policy development. Better policies would result and clients would be better served if clients and their advocates
participated in policy development through advisory groups, legis2' 3
lative lobbying and "negotiated rulemaking.
Courts have the power, and should exercise that power in appropriate circumstances, to strike down laws, policies and practices
that violate the state or federal constitutions or other preemptive
laws. However, judges should not fashion wide-ranging relief that
substitutes their views of policy, or those of a litigant, for those of
the legislature and the executive branch officials to whom the New
York State Constitution delegates policy-making authority,2 4 without finding any violation of law or a constitutional provision that
would warrant such extraordinary judicial relief.
Part II of this Article will describe the proper role of the courts
when evaluating the actions of government officials and the proper
procedures for doing so. Part III will discuss several cases brought
against officials of the New York State Department of Social Services and local governments, 25 primarily in New York City, in which
23. Negotiated rule-making refers to a process whereby all parties with a stake in
a particular subject matter - the regulated industry, the affected clients, the public and
the regulatory agency - join together to "negotiate" the content of a regulation to be
promulgated by an administrative agency. Negotiated rule-making may be formal
[N.Y. Exec. Order No. 156, Exec. Law § 4.156 (June 1992)] or informal (the Department of Social Services used an informal type of negotiated rule-making to develop
the regulations governing shelters for families. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 18, § 900 (1986).
24. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1; art. IV, § 1. N. Y. State Inspection, Sec. and Law
Enforcement Employees v. Cuomo, 475 N.E.2d 90, 93 (N.Y. 1984); People ex reL
Broderick v. Morton, 50 N.E. 791, 793 (N.Y. 1898); People ex rel. Burby v. Howland,
49 N.E. 775, 779 (N.Y. 1898); Methodist Hosp. of Brooklyn v. State Ins. Fund, 459
N.Y.S.2d 521, 525 (Sup. Ct. 1983), aff'd, 479 N.Y.S.2d 11 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), aff'd,
476 N.E.2d 304 (N.Y. 1985), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 801 (1985).
25. In New York State, the social services system is state-supervised but locally
administered. While policies are developed and State and federal funding are provided to local governments by the New York State Department of Social Services,
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the courts have abandoned their appropriate role, misused preliminary injunctive relief and, in some cases, reached results that have
ultimately been detrimental to the interests of the plaintiff classes.
Using those decisions to illustrate its thesis, this Article concludes
that litigation is largely counterproductive to the development of a
coherent and feasible social welfare policy and interferes with the
constitutionally-derived separation of powers.
II. The Proper Role of the Courts
The organization of the government of the State of New York, as
set forth in the New York State Constitution, mirrors that of the
federal government. It is axiomatic that there are three "co-equal"
branches of government and that the New York State Constitution
commits very different powers to each branch.26 The power of the
judiciary to review acts of the legislature and executive branch officials is well established, as are the standards that must be applied in
undertaking such review. 7
In challenging the actions of executive branch officials, a plaintiff must prove that he or she has an underlying legal right or entitlement to benefits or services and that the actions (or inactions) of
the government officials have infringed upon that right.28 If a court
determines that a plaintiff does have a particular legal right or entitlement and that the actions complained of do in some way infringe
upon that right or entitlement, then the court reaches the stage of
fashioning appropriate remedial relief to redress the harm suffered.29 When reviewing the acts of other branches of government,
the judiciary is expected to abide by certain principles that take
into account the separation of powers. 30 In fashioning remedial relief, courts are expected to exercise restraint and grant relief that is
targeted to correcting the harm. 31 As the court in Klostermann v.
benefits are provided and services are delivered by 58 local social services districts
throughout the State. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 17, 20, 34, 61 and 62 (McKinney

1992). Local governments also contribute a share of the funds for benefits and services. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 153(a)-(h) (McKinney 1992).
26. N.Y. CONsT. art. III, § 1; art. IV, § 1, art. VI, § 1. See N.Y.S. Employees, 475
N.E.2d at 93; Morton, 50 N.E. at 144; Howland, 49 N.E. at 779; Methodist Hosp., 459
N.Y.S.2d at 525.

27. N.Y.S. Employees, 475 N.E. at 93; Morton, 50 N.E. at 144-45; Howland, 49
N.E.2d at 779.

28. See, e.g., Klostermann v. Cuomo, 463 N.E.2d 588 (N.Y. 1984); Jones v. Beame,
380 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1978).
29. Klostermann, 463 N.E.2d at 596.

30. Id.
31. Id.
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Cuomo 32 observed, courts should not issue orders or judgments

that intrude upon the policy-making prerogatives and discretionary

power of the other branches of government.33 Thus, a court may

not order the legislature to appropriate money, because the New
York State Constitution commits that prerogative to the legisla-

ture.34 Further, a court may order an executive branch official to
carry out a mandated duty, but where that duty involves the exercise of discretion, a court usually should not direct the manner in
which that discretion is to be exercised, because that discretion has
been committed by the New York State Constitution to the execu-

tive branch.35 As the court in Klostermann also observed, the
other branches of government are better equipped to develop poli-

cies and programs, especially those that require choosing among

competing goals and allocating sometimes scarce funds.36 If, how-

ever, an executive branch official fails to exercise the discretion
committed to him or her, or somehow abuses that discretion, a
court may issue a more detailed remedial order. 37 Before such order can be issued, however, our jurisprudence contemplates that a

full development of the facts and law will take place either through
a trial or a summary proceeding.38
Each year approximately 500 new lawsuits are filed against the
New York State Department of Social Services, its executive offi-

32. 463 N.E.2d 588 (N.Y. 1984).
33. The activity that the courts must be careful to avoid is the fashioning of orders
or judgments that go beyond any mandatory directives of existing statutes and regulations and intrude upon the policy-making and discretionary decisions that are reserved to the legislative and executive branches. Klostermann, 463 N.E.2d at 596.
34. N.Y. CoNsT. art. VII, § 7; Jiggetts v. Grinker, 553 N.E.2d 570, 572 (N.Y. 1990);
People v. Tremaine, 168 N.E. 817, 822 (N.Y. 1929).
35. See Jiggetts, 553 N.E.2d at 572.
36. The court wrote:
The paramount concern is that the judiciary not undertake tasks that the
other branches [of government] are better suited to perform. Acquiring
data and applying expert advice to formulate broad programs cannot be economically done by the courts. This restraint is particularly important when
the creation of a program entails selecting [from] among competing and
equally meritorious approaches so as to allocate scarce resources. Generally, the manner by which the State addresses complex societal and governmental issues is a subject left to the discretion of the legislative and executive
branches of our tripartite system.
Klostermann, 463 N.E.2d at 593 (citation omitted).
37. Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 248 N.Y.S.2d 792, 801-02 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964), aff'd
204 N.E.2d 627 (N.Y. 1965).
38. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 7801 (McKinney 1994).

1995]

LITIGATIONAL SOCIAL WELFARE-POLICY

1015

cials and local government officials.39 Although many of these
cases are suits on behalf of individual clients seeking limited re-

lief, ° approximately forty to fifty of the cases fied each year are
class actions that have some sort of institutional reform as their
goal or are challenges to a variety of social services policies.4' In
over ten years, however, only a handful of these cases have ever
gone to trial, despite a multitude of court orders directing specific
and often wide-ranging relief.4 2
These court orders have formed the basis for years of continuing
litigation over their meaning and enforcement and, in some cases,
for findings of contempt against government officials and administrators.43 The orders either have been issued with the consent of
the parties 4 or are preliminary injunctions. 45 When a consent de-

39. Information provided by John E. Robitzek, Acting Deputy Commissioner and
General Counsel, New York State Department of Social Services, Division of Legal
Affairs (Mar. 1995).
40. Pursuant to the New York State Civil Practice Law and Review Article 78,
review of the actions of government agencies and officials may be had in a special
proceeding. These proceedings have subsumed the common law writs of prohibition
and mandamus. These proceedings are often used to review the actions of government officials in individual cases or to determine whether a decision after a fair hearing is supported by "substantial evidence"; N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. &. R. 7801-7804
(McKinney 1994).
41. Information provided by John E. Robitzek, Acting Deputy Commissioner and
General Counsel, New York State Department of Social Services, Division of Legal
Affairs (Mar. 1995).
42. According to statistics of the New York State Department of Social Services,
Division of Legal Affairs, in the past ten years, four cases have gone to full trials on
the merits: Mixon v. Grinker, 595 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup. Ct. 1993); Jiggetts v. Grinker,
553 N.E.2d 570 (N.Y. 1990); Dinkins v. Perales, Index Number 1457/82 (Sup. Ct.,
Alb. County 1982) ; Anderson v. Perales, 91 Civ. No. 1294 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
43. In McCain v. Koch, Index No. 41023/83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983), various
administrators of the New York City Human Resources Administration and the
Mayor's Office, in both the Dinkins and Guiliani Administrations, have been held in
contempt of court for failing to place homeless families in temporary housing placements "immediately." E.g. Order, Freedman, J., Jan. 8, 1991; Order, Freedman, J.,
Nov. 13, 1992; Order, Freedman, J., Nov. 20, 1992; Order, Freedman, J., Dec. 8, 1992;
McCain v, Dinkins, 601 N.Y.S.2d 271 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); order aff'd as modified,
639 N.E.2d 1132 (N.Y. 1994); mot. to amend denied, 641 N.E.2d 152 (N.Y. 1994);
Order, Freedman, J., Mar. 22, 1993; Order Freedman, J., Aug. 3, 1993; Order, Freedman, J., Dec. 8, 1993; Order, Freedman, J., Sept. 23, 1994. See discussion of McCain,
infra part IIIB.
44. See Consent Decree, Callahan v. Carey, Index No. 42582/79 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County Aug. 1981); Stipulation of Settlement, Wilder v. Bernstein, 78 Civ. 957
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1985); Stipulation and Order, McCain v. Koch, Index No. 41023/83
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County June 1, 1990). These cases will be discussed in greater detail,
infra part III.
45. See McCain v. Koch, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985, 988 (Sup. Ct. 1984); Lamboy v. Gross,
493 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1985). These cases will be discussed in greater detail infra
part III.B.
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cree is entered into by government officials or when an order is
issued by the court with the consent of the parties, it typically contains an explicit statement that there has been no admission by the
government defendants that the conduct or policy complained of
violates the law.4 In addition, it often retains discretion for the
appropriate government officials to change policy or practices
without further court review or intervention. 7

A preliminary injunction in New York State is issued upon a
finding that irreparable harm will result to the plaintiff unless the
conduct complained of or implementation of the policy sought to
be enjoined is halted immediately, and that the balance of the equi-

ties favors taking action on plaintiff's behalf. For such an injunction to be granted, the plaintiff must demonstrate that there is a8
strong likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claim.

A preliminary injunction is intended to maintain the status quo in
an action until a full development of the facts and the law can be
undertaken, usually through a trial.49 In many cases, however,
"preliminary" injunctions remain in place for years. Plaintiffs are
thus provided with all of the relief sought in the action, without any

adjudicated finding on the merits of plaintiffs' claims. The relief
granted is often wide-ranging and has a serious impact on the ad-

ministration of the social services system and on the state and local
budgets.

°

46. E.g. Consent Decree, Callahan (Index No. 42582/79) ("Now, therefore, without final adjudication of any fact or law herein and without this Final Judgment constituting any evidence or admission by any party hereto with respect to any issue, and
upon consent of all parties it is hereby..
47. E.g. Consent Decree 18, Callahan (Index No. 42582/79) ("Nothing in this
judgment shall prevent, limit or otherwise interfere with the authority of the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services to enforce or carry out
her duties under the New York Social Services Law, Title 18, of the New York Code
of Rules and Regulations, or any other applicable law.").
48. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 6301 (McKinney 1962); See Paine & Chriscott v. Blair
House Assoc., 417 N.Y.S.2d 68, 69 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Tucker v. Toia, 388
N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 371 N.E.2d 449 (N.Y. 1977); Walker
Memorial Baptist Church v. Saunders, 17 N.Y.S.2d 842, 847 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 21
N.Y.S.2d 512 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 35 N.E.2d 42 (N.Y.
1941).
49. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 6301 (McKinney 1962); See Int'l Ry. Co. v. Barone,
284 N.Y.S. 122, 128 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935); Paine & Chriscott, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 68;
Walker Memorial Baptist Church, 35 N.E.2d at 47; Tucker, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 477;
Schlosser v. United Presbyterian Home at Syosset, Inc., 391 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1977).
50. In SFY 1993-94, the costs of implementing the preliminary relief ordered by
the trial court in Jiggetts and Perales totaled $55 million, with a state share of $13.8
million, a federal share of $27.5 million, and a local share (NYC) of $13.8 million.
Jiggetts was tried in 1991. No decision has been issued in over 3 years, and the costs of
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These trends have resulted in a serious disruption in the separation of powers among the three branches of government in New
York State. In a number of cases, the courts have halted the operation of statutes passed by the legislature and signed into law by the
governor, budget priorities jointly set by the legislature and the executive branch and enacted into law, and policies implemented by
executive branch administrative agencies, as delegated by the legislature. 5 1 These decisions often have been made without any judicial determination that the laws, priorities or policies are illegal.
Judges have usurped the authority of the other branches of government, imposed their own or a litigant's preferred policies and procedures and caused the expenditure of millions of dollars in tax
funds of the state and local governments, all in the name of maintaining the "status quo" and protecting clients from irreparable
harm. Some of these injunctions have been catalysts for the implementation of policies that, in fact, have been detrimental to the
interests of the plaintiff classes.
IH. Some Ilustrative Cases
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, advocates for applicants for
and recipients of social services brought many class action lawsuits
against the New York State Department of Social Services, local
social services districts, primarily New York City, and their officials. These actions sought to establish new rights, such as a right
to shelter, or to stop the implementation of various social services
policies that the advocates believed to be inappropriate. In many
of the cases, the courts became entangled in the policy-making and
discretionary functions of the legislative and executive branches of
government, and used preliminary injunctions to give plaintiffs, in
effect, all of the relief sought in the underlying actions, without definitive rulings on the merits of plaintiffs' claims. In some cases this
actually resulted in the implementation of policies that were inimical to the interests of the plaintiffs. This Part will discuss several of
these cases and the lessons to be learned from them for advocates,
courts and government officials.

implementing the preliminary relief continue to mount. At the present time, more
than 21,000 families are receiving some form of "Jiggetts" relief. For a full discussion
of the case, see infra part III.C.
51. For a discussion of some examples, see infra part III.
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Callahan v. Carey

The first case in the nation to focus attention on the plight of the
homeless was Callahan v. Carey. The case was commenced in
October 1979 against the Governor of New York, the Commissioner of Social Services, the Mayor of New York City, the Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration
and other state and city government officials.5 3 The plaintiffs represented a class of homeless men who had sought shelter in facilities administered by the City of New York. 4 These facilities
included hotels, shelters and, in later years, armories used to shelter the homeless.5 5 The plaintiffs asserted claims under the United
States Constitution, the New York State Constitution, the Social
Services Law, the Mental Hygiene Law, the New York City Charter, the regulations of the New York State Departments of Social
Services and of Mental Hygiene and the Administrative Code of
the City of New York.5 6 They sought declarative and injunctive
relief to enjoin the state and city governments from neglecting to
provide emergency shelter for homeless men. 7
The case was settled in August 1981, when the parties entered
into a consent decree in which the city defendants agreed to provide shelter to each homeless man who met the need standard for
New York State's Home Relief Program or who, by reason of physical, mental or social dysfunction, needed shelter (hereinafter
"Consent Decree").5 8 The city also agreed t6 abide by certain standards governing space, capacity, cleanliness and resident rights. 9
Callahan has come to be viewed 6° as establishing an unfettered
"right to shelter" for single homeless men and women 61 in New
52. Index No. 42582/79 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979).

53. Id.
54. Id.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Complaint, Callahan (Index No. 42582/79).
58. Consent Decree 1 1, Callahan (Index No. 42582/79).
59. Consent Decree 11 2, 3, and 4, Callahan (Index No. 42582/79).

60. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Chackes, Sheltering the Homeless: JudicialEnforcement
of GovernmentalDuties to the Poor,31 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 155, 176-77
nn.116-121 (1987); Ronald Slye, Community Institution Building: A Response to the
Limits of Litigation in Addressing the Problem of Homelessness, 36 VILL. L. REV.
1035, 1053 n.91 (1991).
61. The case of Eldredge v. Koch, 469 N.Y.S.2d 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) required the application of the CallahanConsent Decree to homeless women, using an
Equal Protection analysis. While it is clear that homeless women are entitled to and

should be provided with the same benefits and services provided to homeless men, it
is questionable how frequently government officials will be inclined to enter into con-
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York City and New York State. This assertion, however, misinterprets the meaning of Callahan. As described above, applicants for
shelter must meet the standard of need for the Home Relief program 62 or need shelter as a result of a serious dysfunction. In addition, the Consent Decree contains language explicitly stating that
there had been no final adjudication of any issue of fact or law 63including the issue of whether there is a right to shelter in New
York State. In fact, the standards established in the Consent Decree mirrored many elements of the New York State Department
of Social Services regulations at the time. 64 Further, the Consent
Decree contained explicit language recognizing the right of the
Commissioner of Social Services to change or modify the standards
as necessary 65 and recognizing that the court could not order the
legislatureto appropriate money to cover the costs associated with
complying with the terms of the Decree. 66 The court, however, retained jurisdiction over modifications and enforcement of the Decree, which contained no expiration date or "sunset" clause.67
The Consent Decree was substantially modified in 1982 to revise
the standards for space, shower and toilet facilities and conditions
at the armories. 68 In addition, plaintiffs petitioned the court sevsent judgments in the future when the terms of the decrees can, without consent, be
expanded to classes of persons who were not parties to the initial litigation, nor the
intended beneficiaries of the decree. A claim under the Equal Protection clauses of
the New York state and U. S. Constitutions seeking to expand the Callahan Consent
Decree to include homeless families with children is one of the claims in McCain' See
Class Action Complaint, Third Claim, McCain v. Koch, Index No. 41023/83 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County, Mar. 31, 1983).
62. The requirements of the Home Relief program, New York State's general.
assistance program for single individuals, are set forth in the N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§ 157 (McKinney 1994) and the regulations of the Department of Social Services,
N.Y. CoMp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 370.1 (1982).
63. See text accompanying footnote 46.
64. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 18, Part 900 (1978). The regulations were
subsequently repealed and a new Part 491 was added, effective Sept. 1, 1984. Those
regulations are currently in effect. See N.Y. CoMp. CODES R. & REos. tit. 18, Part 900
(1986).
65. See text accompanying footnote 47.
66. See Consent Decree 17, Callahan (Index No. 42582/79).
67. The parties' failure to include a "sunset" clause and the subsequent experience
of New York City and New York State government officials with years of motions to
enforce or modify the decree resulted in the adoption of policies by both the City of
New York and the New York State Department of Social Services against entering
into such decrees. Subsequent consent decrees contained expiration dates for the decrees, typically five years. Information provided by John E. Robitzek, Acting Deputy
Commissioner & General Counsel, New York State Depatment of Social Services,
Division. of Legal Affairs, and Jonathan Pines, Deputy Bureau Chief, Litigation Bureau, the Office of the Corporation Counsel (Mar., 1995).
68. Order, Wallach, J., Nov. 4, 1982, Callahan (Index No. 42582/79).
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eral times each year to seek enforcement of various provisions of
the Decree, mostly those regarding space, cleanliness and the ratio
of shower and toilet facilities. 69 The motions for enforcement be-

came so frequent that in 1984 the court felt compelled to issue an
order prohibiting the parties from filing motions without the
court's prior permission.7 °

Plaintiffs continued to file court ap-

proved motions up until 1992.
As a result of Callahan, New York City has the most extensive
system of shelters for homeless adults in the nation. 71 The city di-

rectly operates or funds the operation of thirty-three shelters and
eight armories for single adults. 72 The city and state spend in excess of $170 million each year to provide this shelter.73 While the
fact that each qualified homeless adult in New York City receives
what is sometimes derisively referred to as "three hots and a cot"

may be seen as a substantial achievement, there has, however, been
a significant cost to pay, one that has been paid by the homeless

adults housed in the city's shelters as well as by the state and city
governments. The conditions in the facilities used to shelter homeless adults remain far from ideal, despite the expenditure of over
69. Since 1981, approximately 20 motions have been brought by plaintiffs seeking
enforcement of the decree. See, e.g., Notice of Motion, Apr. 18, 1984; Order to Show
Cause, May 21, 1984; Order to Show Cause, May 30, 1984; Order to Show Cause, July
31, 1985; Notice of Motion, Nov. 6, 1985; Order to Show Cause, Nov. 21, 1986; Callahan (Index No. 42582/79). The court has issued more than 15 orders directing substantive relief. See, e.g., Order, Wallach, J., Oct. 20, 1981; Order, Wallach, J., July 12,
1984; Order, Wallach, J., Oct. 1, 1985; Order, Wallach, J., Oct. 15, 1985; Order, Sklar,
J., July 18, 1986; Order, Skiar, J., Nov. 28, 1986; Order, Skiar, J., Oct. 1, 1987; Callahan
(Index No. 42582/79).
70. Order, Wallach, J., Oct. 15, 1984, Callahan (Index No. 42582/79).
71. Because the action was brought originally in New York City and the Consent
Decree was entered into by New York City, the terms of the Consent Decree apply
only to New York City. The obligations of other social services districts throughout
New York State to shelter the homeless and the standards governing the provision of
shelter to the homeless are set forth in an Administrative Directive -issued by the
Commissioner of Social Services (previously 83 ADM 47 issued on Sept. 29, 1983,
now 94 ADM 20, issued-on Dec. 29, 1994) and in the regulations of the New York
State Department of Social Services, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, Part 491
(1984)(shelters for single adults), Part 900 (1986)(shelters for families), Part 1000
(1989) (shelters for pregnant women), § 352.3(e)-(h) (1994)(hotels used to shelter
homeless families).
72. Information provided by Robert Dawes, the New York State Department of
Social Services, Office of Housing and Adult Services (Mar. 1995).
73. Information provided by Susan Faulkner, the New York State Department of
Social Services, Office of Budget Management. The costs of sheltering homeless
adults are a combination of public institutional care costs (N.Y. SoC. SERv. LAW § 193
(McKinney 1992)) and Home Relief Costs (N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 157 (McKinney
1992)). These costs are borne equally by the State of New York and New York City.
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 153(a)-(h) (McKinney 1992).
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$1.5 billion since 1979. 74 As a result of the constant focus on maintaining the standards of the Consent Decree,75 millions of dollars
were spent to improve conditions in armories 76 and other shelters

that should never have been used to shelter anyone in the first
place.77 The ability of the city and state to develop homeless policy

in a deliberative and rational manner was impeded by the need to
respond to frequent motions for enforcement of the Consent Decree. Determining what types of facilities and programs would

truly meet the needs of the residents of adult shelters became a
lower priority than ensuring that, for example, there were forty toilets working in the Fort Washington Armory.78 Eventually, even
the court became frustrated with the focus on certain of the less

important conditions in the armories,79 recognizing that energy,
political capital and money that should have been used to develop
programs to assist shelter residents to attain self-sufficiency were
being dissipated.8"
74. Information provided by Mark Sullivan, former' Budget Director, Office of
Budget Management, the New York State Department of Social Services (Mar. 1995).
75. See text accompanying footnote 69.
76. While exact figures for repairs to deteriorated shelters and armories are not
available, the New York State Department of Social Services estimates that more than
$40 million has been spent on repairs to these facilities since 1979. Information provided by Mark Sullivan, former Budget Director, Office of Budget Management, the
New York State Department of Social Services (Mar. 1995).
77. The first armory shelter was opened by executive order of Governor Hugh
Carey. N.Y. Exec. Order Nos. 106 and 107, Exec. Law §,3.106 and § 3.107 (Jan. 5,
1981). Subsequent armories were opened as the demand for shelter increased or as a
result of motions by plaintiffs and orders by the court. See, e.g., Order, Wallach, J.,
Oct. 20, 1981, Callahan (Index No. 42582/79) and subsequent N.Y. Exec. Order No.
116, Executive Law § 3.116 (Nov. 25, 1981).
78. At one point, the city even conducted a survey of the use of the toilet facilities
in an effort to convince the court that the shower and toilet ratios in the decree should
be modified. See Levine and Surcek, An ObservationalStudy of Toilet and Shower
Utilization at Three Men's Shelters, Feb. 4, 1985.
79. Several motions were filed and court orders issued over matters such as broken lockers and the quality of the laundry service provided in the armories. See, e.g.,
Order, Wallach, J., July 12, 1984; Order, Wallach, J., Oct. 1, 1985; Order, Sklar, J., July
18, 1986; Callahan (Index No. 42582/79).
80. In response to a motion made by plaintiff's counsel in May, 1990, Judge Sklar
visited several of the armory shelters and spoke with the residents. The motion
sought enforcement of various of the Consent Decree's provisions concerning conditions in the shelters and sought the closing of all armory shelters. After speaking with
the residents of the shelters, Judge Sklar admonished plaintiffs' counsel to speak with
his clients, suggesting that the residents were more concerned with access to permanent housing, jobs and treatment for substance abuse than with the number of toilets
and showers in each armory and whether a partition of sufficient height was erected
between the sleeping and dining areas of one of the shelters.
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McCain v. Koch

The plaintiffs in McCain v. Koch8l sought to establish a right to
shelter for homeless families with children, relying upon various
state and federal statutory and constitutional provisions. 82 The
case was commenced in 1983 against the Mayor of the City of New
York, the Commissioner of New York City's Human Resources
Administration, the Commissioner of New York City's Department of Housing, Preservation and Development, the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services and
various other New York City officials. After almost twelve years,
the McCain case is still pending, and there has been no trial on the
merits of plaintiffs' claims. The case began with a most scrupulous
observance by the courts of the appropriate parameters of judicial
involvement in social welfare policy issues, but in the intervening
years it has deteriorated into one of the most egregious examples
of excessive judicial entanglement in the prerogatives of the executive branch of government.
In June 1983, the court issued an interim order requiring that
"[w]hen a family is not denied emergency housing, assistance and
services," the defendant city and state agencies should "arrange so
far as practical" that such housing meet minimum quality standards
that the court delineated. 83 At the time of the court's order, homeless families were being housed in shelters, hotels and motels
throughout the city. 84 Subsequent to the court's order, the New
York State Department of Social Services promulgated regulations
governing standards in these hotels and motels used as shelters.8 5
Although many of the standards of the interim order were incorporated into the state's regulations, the regulations were more extensive than the court's order.8 6 The New York State Department of
81. 484 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
82. Plaintiffs asserted claims under Article 17 of the New York State Constitution,
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the New York State and U.S. Constitutions, the Social Security Act provisions governing the AFDC program, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 601-645 (1968), the Social Services Law provisions governing the ADC program,
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 131-152, 343-360 (McKinney 1992), and various other federal, New York State and New York City statutes and regulations. Class Action Complaint 1 21-44, McCain v. Koch, Index No. 41023/83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, 1983).
83. Interim Order, June 20, 1983, McCain (Index No. 41023/83).
84. Class Action Complaint at 16, McCain (Index No. 41023/83).
85. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, Parts 352.3(g)-(h) (1983).
86. For example, the court's order required that such housing contain a bed for
each family member, with a clean mattress, pillow, sheets and blanket; contain a sufficient number of clean towels; contain sufficient space for the family based on New
York City's Administrative Code; have access to a sanitary bathroom with hot water;
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Social Services also issued an Administrative Directive 87 to all social services districts spelling out what assistance should be provided to eligible homeless persons. The following year, the court
issued a preliminary injunction incorporating the standards established by the interim order. The court found that plaintiffs had established a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their
claims, that irreparable harm would result, and that the balance of
the equities weighed in their favor. In its decision, the court noted
that neither the New York State Constitution nor the Social Services Law require that emergency shelter be provided. Rather, the
court found that once the defendants had undertaken to provide
emergency shelter, the shelter provided must meet "reasonable
minimum standards" as established by the court.8 8
In August 1984, the court refused to order the city to cease placing families in the large congregate shelters it had opened to accommodate the increasing number of homeless families seeking
shelter, declined to set limitations on the use of congregate shelters
and refused to order the closing of specific congregate shelters, as
sought by the plaintiffs. 89 The court found that plaintiffs had failed
to demonstrate the requisite harm, likelihood of success and balance of the equities to warrant issuance of an injunction. 90 While
recognizing that large congregate shelters were not "conducive to
privacy" and were "imperfect," the court refused to order their
closing and recommended that the government defendants provide
a mechanism for minimizing the length of stay in such facilities.
With respect to one particular facility, the court declined to "intervene in a dispute between two levels of government" where the
city and state disagreed over the use of the facility. 91
The case then moved into the appellate courts. In May 1986, the
Appellate Division unanimously upheld the grant of a preliminary
and be sufficiently heated under applicable New York City law. The regulations required that the hotel or motel have arrangements for garbage removal; maintenance
of floors, drapes and furniture; repainting periodically; maintenance of plumbing and
heating; vermin control; and that each room be cleaned every other day, have sufficient furniture for daily living, and have a complete change of linens and towels each

week. The regulations also required each family to have a private bathroom. N.Y.
COMP. & CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, Parts 352.3(g)-(h) (1983).
87. 83 ADM 47, issued Sept. 29, 1983.

88. The court stated, in part, "[njeither the Constitution nor the Social Services
Law... provide that emergency shelter shall be given to the needy in explicit terms."
McCain v. Koch, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
89. Order, Greenfield, J., July 31, 1984, McCain (Index No. 41023/83).

90. Id.
91. Id.
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injunction barring the denial of emergency shelter to homeless
families, finding that the plaintiffs had made the requisite showings
to warrant its issuance. 92 The court examined each of plaintiffs'
statutory and constitutional claims for a right to shelter, each time
finding a strong likelihood that plaintiffs would succeed in proving
their claim. 93 However, the court reversed the lower court orders
establishing minimum standards. Based upon its interpretation of
New York Court of Appeals precedents, 94 the court held that pursuant to the state Constitution, 95 the adequacy of welfare benefits,
including the adequacy of shelter assistance provided pursuant to a
constitutional right to shelter, was a matter for the discretion of the
legislature. 96 The court also held that the issuance of the lower
court's preliminary injunction mandating standards for the provision of emergency shelter was unnecessary, because the regulations
promulgated by the New York State Department of Social Services
obviated the need for the court's intervention.97 Finally, the court
concurred with the lower court's refusal to order the closing of congregate shelters for homeless families "[i]n accordance with our
recognition of the state's discretion as to the quality of emergency

shelter. "98
In the Court of Appeals, both plaintiffs and defendants extensively briefed the issue of whether the cited state and federal statutory and constitutional provisions guaranteed a right to shelter for
homeless families. 9 The court, however, did not rule on this issue.
Nevertheless, McCain is often cited by advocates, in the media and
elsewhere'0° as the case in which the Court of Appeals established
a right to shelter for homeless families. This is incorrect. The sole
issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the lower court had
the power to "fashion equitable relief" and issue a preliminary injunction requiring the city defendants, "when they have under92. McCain v. Koch, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).

93. Id. at 728-30.
94. Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449 (N.Y. 1977); Bernstein v. Toia, 373 N.E.2d 238
(N.Y. 1977).
95. According to the New York State Constitution, "[t]he aid, care and support of
the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its
subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time
to time determine." N.Y. CONST. art.17, § 1.

96. McCain, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 731.
97. Id at 732.
98. Id.
99. Brief for Appellants at 19-33; Brief for Municipal Respondents at 46-71; Reply
Brief for Appellants at 18-22; 28-39, McCain (Index No. 41023/83).
100. See Chackes, supra note 60, at 177 n. 121.
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taken to provide emergency housing for homeless families with
children, to provide housing which satisfies minimum standards of
sanitation, safety and decency. ' 101
The unanimous court held that the lower court did have such
power, noting, however, that the injunction "does not direct de10 2
fendants to provide housing where none is being provided."
Later in its opinion, the court reiterated the limited scope of its
holding and stated, "Thus to decide the narrow issue here, it is not
necessary to resolve questions pertaining to the underlying obligation to furnish 'emergency shelter to eligible families with children'. We do not reach them.' 0 3 Furthermore, because of the
procedural posture of the case, the court did not address that portion of the Appellate Division order that granted a preliminary injunction barring the city from denying emergency shelter to
homeless families. Some have interpreted the Appellate Division's decision as a finding that there is a right to shelter for homeless families in New York State. The court also did not address the
Appellate Division's finding that plaintiffs- were unlikely to prove
their constitutional claim regarding the adequacy of the emergency
shelter provided, finding that whether or not the plaintiffs had a
right to shelter, the lower court had the power to require the state
and city defendants to make the shelter that they had undertaken
to provide habitable.) ° The court then made clear that the city
defendants had to comply with the state's
enacted
0 5 subsequently
,
regulations so long as they were in effect.
Finally, the court held that the lower court did not violate the
principle that a court should, as a matter of policy, "'abstain from
venturing into areas if it is ill-equipped to undertake responsibility
and other branches of government are far more suited to the
task'.' 0 6 Rejecting the Appellate Division's finding that the lower
court was precluded by precedent from setting minimum stan101. McCain v. Koch, 511 N.E.2d 62, 62-63 (N.Y. 1987).
102. Id. at 63 (emphasis in original).

103. Id at 65 (citation omitted).
104. Id. at 65-66.

105. Id ("Because we hold that, whether or not plaintiffs have any right to shelter
under State or Federal Constitutional or statutory law, Supreme Court had the power
to require defendants, once they undertook to provide housing, to make that shelter
minimally habitable, we conclude that Bernstein poses no bar to the grant of injunctive relief in this case. Moreover, when defendants undertake to provide emergency
housing, they must now comply with the State departmental regulations..., and thus,

so long as the regulations are in effect, no question can exist concerning the minimum
standards for the accommodations to be provided.").
106. Id at 66 (quoting Jones v. Beame, 380 N.E.2d 277, 280 (N.Y. 1978)).
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dards, 10 7 the court found that because the New York State Department of Social Services had not acted, and, at the time of the lower
court's order, no regulation governing shelter standards had been
promulgated, the court could invoke its equitable powers and establish its own minimum standards. 08 Furthermore, the court
found that the lower court could keep its standards in place even
after the New York State Department of Social Services had acted
because there was no conflict with the promulgated regulations,
which were more stringent and extensive. 1' 9 The court then concluded that there was no question that the city now had to comply
with the regulatory standards and all that remained were questions
of compliance and enforcement. 110
The Court of Appeals decision was issued in June, 1987. Simultaneously, the litigation continued in the lower courts, where it is
still on-going. While the courts were initially, as described above,
very careful to apply the appropriate standards for evaluating the
actions of the Executive branch officials and wary of intruding
upon the discretion committed to such officials, the lower courts
began to take a different approach. Numerous motions for injunctive relief were brought by plaintiffs, seeking to prohibit the City of
New York from housing homeless families in various types of facilities that were alleged not to meet the appropriate State regulatory
standards and various local laws. Still with no trial or ruling on the
merits of the plaintiffs' underlying claims, the court began issuing a
series of orders"' in McCain and in two cases consolidated with it,
Lamboy v. Gross"2 and Slade v. Koch,"3 that placed more and
more types of facilities and hotel rooms out of the City's reach as
accomodations for sheltering homeless families. Consequently, the
City attempted to develop plans to address the increasing numbers
of homeless families Seeking shelter and entered into various stipulations 1 4 that set forth the standards to which it would adhere in
placing families in hotels, motels and family shelters. These stipu107. Id. at 66.
108. Id.
109. McCain, 511 N.E.2d at 67.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Order, Freedman, J., Feb. 15, 1991; Order Freedman, J., July 18, 1991,
McCain (Index No. 41023/83). In all approximately 30 orders have been issued in
McCain to date. Throughout 1990 and 1991, orders were issued almost monthly.
112. Index No. 41108/85 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1985).
113. Index No. 45177/86 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1986).
114. See, e.g., Stipulation and Enforcement Order, Freedman, J., June 1, 1990, McCain (Index No. 41023/83).
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lations and orders 15 committed the city to developing permanent
housing and types of preferred temporary housing for homeless
families, 16 to giving homeless families placement priority in housing managed and developed by various city agencies 17 and to
meeting time frames for ceasing to use hotels and motels to shelter
homeless families."18 Many of these orders would have been ap-

propriate if there had been a ruling that plaintiffs had a right to
shelter. In several instances, however, the court essentially substituted its views of the appropriate standards to be applied for those
of the executive agency officials whose responsibility it was to develop standards for providing shelter to homeless families once
they had "undertaken" to do So. Two particular orders stand out
because the lower courts clearly indicated their intentions to substi-

tute their judgment for that of state and city officials administering
the programs of assistance to homeless families."

9

115. See, e.g., Order, Freedman, J., Nov. 9, 1990; Order, Freedman, J., Nov. 29,
1990; Order, Freedman, J., Jan. 8, 1991, McCain (Index No. 41023/83).
116. Numerous temporary shelters for homeless families, known as "Tier II" shelters, were developed after promulgation of regulations by the New York State Department of Social Services setting forth standards for such shelters and a mechanism
for funding their development. N.Y. COMp. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 18, Parts
900.10(1)(c), 900.16 (1986).
117. The New York City Housing Authority began giving preferences to homeless
families for placement in apartments in buildings owned and managed by the Authority. Affidavit of Ernestine Young, Director of Housing Applications, New York City
Housing Authority, submitted to the court, July, 1993. The New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development began giving homeless families preference for placement in buildings taken over by the city in tax foreclosure
proceedings. From 1984 to 1993, the city spent more than $1 billion developing and
renovating permanent housing that was provided to homeless families. Affidavit of
William Spiller, Deputy Commissioner, City of New York Department of Housing
Preservation and Development, submitted to the court, July, 1993. See Order, Freedman, J., Aug. 3, 1993, McCain (Index No. 41023/83).
118. The City Council of New York passed a local law prohibiting the use of hotels
and motels to shelter homeless families after April 1993. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21A,
§ 21-308 (1993). The deadline has been extended numerous times; the current deadline is June 1, 1995. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21A, § 21-308(3) (1993). The city currently houses 962 families in hotels and motels. Information provided by Peter Brest,
former Associate Commissioner of the Office of Housing & Adult Services, New
York State Department of Social Services.
119. Another recent example of courts substituting their judgment for that of Executive branch officials is a case concerning homeless individuals, rather than families.
Plaintiffs sought to require the City of New York to reduce the number of men residing in an armory to 200, as set forth in the regulations of the New York State Department of Social Services and the CallahanConsent Decree. The lower court granted
plaintiff's application (Order, Schlesinger, J., Dec. 23, 1992, Callahan (Index No.
42582/79)) based upon fire safety concerns, and that order was affirmed by the Appellate Division, First Department. Doe v. Dinkins, 600 N.Y.S.2d 939 (N.Y. App. Div.
1993). The Appellate Division recognized the authority of the Commissioner of So-
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In a decision issued in August 1985,120 and an order entered in
October 1985,121 the court interpreted the New York State Department of Social Services' Administrative Directive on assistance to

the homeless 22 and found that "[i]n no event shall provision of
overnight accommodations in the city respondents' welfare offices
(including Income Maintenance Centers and Emergency Assistance units) constitute the provision of emergency housing pursuant
to the requirements of Administrative Directive 83 ADM-47 or
this Order. 1 2 3 The court found that the ADM required that each

eligible homeless family be placed immediately in an appropriate
accommodation, regardless of any constraints on the city's ability
to do so. 124 The New York State Department of Social Services
had argued that while a "determination" to place a family in an
emergency assistance unit even for one night would violate the De-

partment's policy, in certain circumstances it might be necessary
25
for a family to spend the night in an emergency assistance unit.
The state argued that these circumstances included "isolated occasions where the local district's good faith efforts to locate prefera-

ble alternative housing are unsuccessful. Reasonable efforts must
be made by the local districts to plan for emergency needs and concial Services to waive the capacity limits of the regulations (N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 18, § 491.3(g)(1)(i) (1984)), noted that the Callahan Consent Decree expressly retained such authority for the Commissioner (See text accompanying footnote 47), and found that the Commissioner had declined to exercise such authority
because of fire safety violations in the armory. Dinkins, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 941-42. The
city made the necessary changes to the armory's fire safety systems, and in January,
1994, the New York City Fire Department, the local code enforcement entity, certified that the systems complied with the applicable code requirements. Thereafter, the
Commissioner of Social Services approved a waiver, with certain conditions attached.
In a subsequent order, the lower court vacated the Commissioner's waiver, based on
the judge's opinion that the armory was still unsafe because it lacked what she viewed
as an effective sprinkler system, despite the Fire Department's certification that the
system met applicable New York City code requirements and despite the Commissioner's decision that the standards for granting a waiver had been met (Order,
Schlesinger, J., Mar. 21, 1994, Callahan (Index No. 42582/79)). The court's order was
again affirmed on appeal. Doe v. Guiliani, 614 N.Y.S.2d 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
120. Lamboy v. Gross, 493 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1985), aff'd, 513 N.Y.S.2d 393
(N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
121. Order, Freedman, J., Oct. 5, 1985, Lamboy v. Gross, Index No. 41108/85(Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1985).
122. 83 ADM 47, issued Aug. 29, 1983.
123. Order, Freedman, J., Oct. 5, 1985, at 5, Lamboy (Index No. 41108/85).
124. The ADM stated, in § IV. A. I. 6: "Emergency housing must be provided
immediately if a homeless person is determined eligible . ..

."

83 ADM 47, at 2,

issued Aug. 29, 1983.
125. Letter submitted to the court in Lamboy v. Gross from Susan V. Demers to
Robert Hayes, dated June 19, 1985.
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sistent and meaningful attempts by staff at the emergency units
must have been made to locate emergency housing for the local
district to meet its obligations under the ADM.' 1 26 The court,
however, disregarded the state agency's interpretation 127
of its own
policy, and on appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed.
While the Appellate Division recognized that the lower court's
1 28
order was "substantially broader and more expansive in scope'
than earlier court orders, it justified the order's breadth as
29 of
"designed to obtain compliance with the definitive standards"
the state's Administrative Directive. The court then stated essentially that "immediate" means "immediate,' 130 and found the
131
state's objection to the court's order "puzzling and illogical.'
Furthermore, despite quoting favorably from the state's explanation of its ADM and policy, the court declined to adopt the state's
interpretation because it would "constitute improper judicial
32
legislation."1
The lower court's order and subsequent orders 133 relying upon it
have formed the basis for findings of contempt against various city
officials13 4 that have resulted in the imposition of fines totaling approximately $4.7 million as of May 1995.'3 The city has paid these
fines to individual families and to plaintiffs' counsel in order to set
up a fund to be used for emergency services to homeless families. 136 Nevertheless, despite the contempt orders and the imposition of these fines, the city has been unable to find shelter for all
homeless families who seek it. In recognition that these sanctions
have failed, the court recently appointed a mediator/facilitator
126. Id.
127. Lamboy v. Gross, 513 N.Y.S.2d 393 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
128. Id. at 395.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 396-97.
131. Id.at 398.
132. Id.
133. See text accompanying footnotes 93, 96 and 97.
134. Order, Freedman, J., Jan. 8, 1991; Order, Freedman, J.,Nov. 13, 1992; Order,
Freedman, J., Nov. 20, 1992; Order, Freedman, J.,Dec. 8, 1992; aff'd sub nom. McCain v. Dinkins, 601 N.Y.S.2d 271 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), aff'd as modified, 639
N.E.2d 1132 (N.Y. 1994); mot. to amend denied, 641 N.E.2d 152 (N.Y. 1994); Order,
Freedman, J., Mar. 22, 1993; Order, Freedman, J., Aug. 3, 1993; Order, Freedman, J.,
Dec. 8, 1993; Order, Freedman, J.,Sept. 23, 1994, Lamboy (Index No. 41108/85).
135. Information provided by Steven Banks of the Legal Aid Society, Plaintiff's
Counsel in McCain v. Koch, 511 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1987).
136. Id
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the parties to reach a solution and achieve
who is assisting
1 37
compliance.
In January 1991, the court issued an interim order, 138 and in
March 1991, the court issued an order 139 prohibiting the city from
placing families in hotels without cooking facilities. The court-did
so even though the state's duly promulgated regulation permitted
the city to place homeless families in hotels without cooking facilities if none with cooking facilities were available.' 40 By combining
an analysis of three state regulatory provisions' 4 ' and refusing to
give deference to the state's own interpretation of one of its regulations because the judge found it to be "not logical," the court concluded that cooking facilities were mandatory. 42 The regulations,
and the state agency's own interpretation of them, to which the
lower court refused to defer, were the same regulations that the
earlier found to be the standards with which
Court of Appeals had 143
the city must comply.
In addition to issuing such orders, the lower court's numerous
orders and decisions are replete with statements setting forth the
judge's view of what standards should apply. 144 The judge has not
only criticized the kinds of meals provided by the city to homeless
families, but has criticized the kinds of meals homeless families
choose to purchase with their own meal allowances. 145 Inevaluating the plans for services to homeless families that the city has submitted to the court for review, the judge frequently criticized the
plans for failing to meet her own or plaintiffs' ideas of appropriate
standards, even going so far as to suggest such things as the number
of staff she believes should be working various shifts at the family
shelters and the number of city vehicles that should be available to
homeless families from waiting areas to shelters and
transport
1 46
hotels.
137. Order, Freedman, J., Nov. 23, 1994, Lamboy (Index No. 41108/85).
138. Interim Order, Freedman, J., Jan. 8, 1991, McCain (Index No. 41023/83).
139. Order, Freedman, J., Mar. 25, 1991, McCain (Index No. 41023/83).
140. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 352.3(e)(2) (1994).
141. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 352.3(e)(2),(g), (h) (1994).
142. Order, Freedman, J., Mar. 25, 1991, McCain (Index No. 41023/83).
143. McCain v. Koch, 511 N.E.2d 62, 62-63 (N.Y. 1987).
144. The court's orders are filled with examples of the judge's views regarding the
kinds of things that should be provided to the homeless families in city shelters and
waiting rooms. See, e.g., Order, Freedman, J., dated Mar. 25, 1991, McCain (Index
No. 41023/83).
145. See, e.g., Order, Freedman, J., dated Mar. 25, 1991 at 17, McCain (Index No.
41023/83).
146. Conferences with Judge Freedman, Oct. 17, Nov. 4, and Nov. 18, 1991. The
author was present at these conferences as were the other parties to the action.
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This kind of judicial entanglement in the day-to-day administration of the State and the City of New York's system for assisting
homeless families is precisely the kind of excessive entanglement in
executive agency operations that courts should avoid and that our
jurisprudence contemplates they will avoid. What is especially in-

appropriate about the court's actions in McCain and its companion.
cases is that the court has never held a trial, never issued a ruling
that plaintiffs have an unambiguous right to shelter, and has never
found that the state and city have failed to provide such shelter to
homeless families in keeping with applicable statutory or constitutional mandates. Instead, the court has consistently substituted its
own policy preferences and those of plaintiffs' counsel for those of
the state and city executive officials responsible for administering
the social services system.
C.

Jiggetts v. Grinker

In March 1987, a group of New York City14 7 recipients of Aid to
Dependent Children (ADC) 1' challenged the amount of the shelter portion 49 of New York State's welfare grant. 50 Plaintiffs alleged that the shelter grant was so inadequate that thousands of
families receiving ADC were becoming homeless,' 5 ' that the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services
had failed in his state and federal statutory and constitutional obligations to promulgate an adequate shelter schedule 152 that would
*147. The plaintiffs in Jiggetts are New York City residents and, since the case is not
a statewide class action, the relief granted is restricted to them. Similar cases have
been filed in other counties throughout New York State. See, e.g., Sharp v. Perales,
573 N.Y.S.2d 410 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
148. New York State's primary welfare program for aiding families with children is
called the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program, rather than the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW., art. 5, tit. 10
§§ 343-362 (McKinney 1992).
149. The welfare grant in New York consists of two components, the "basic grant,"
the amount of which is set forth in statute, and the shelter portion, the amount of
which is set forth in regulations of the New York State Department of Social Services.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131(a) (McKinney 1992); and N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 18, § 352.3 (1994).
150. Jiggetts v. Grinker, 528 N.Y.S.2d 462 (Sup. Ct. 1988), rev'4 543 N.Y.S.2d 414
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989), rev'd 553 N.E.2d 570 (N.Y. 1990).
151. See Jiggetts, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
152. Id at 465. The regulations of the New York State Department of Social Services set forth a schedule of maximum grants payable for shelter that vary by family
size and locality. These grants are called the "shelter maxima" and provide assistance
to each family for shelter that reflects the actual costs of their shelter up to the applicable maximum. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, Part 352.3 (1994).
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allow children to be brought up at home, 5 3 and that the policy that
permitted arrears to be paid for applicants for ADC in amounts
exceeding those payable for recipients of ADC 154 denied recipients
equal protection. In January 1988, the court issued a decision dismissing several of plaintiffs' claims, but granting a preliminary injunction requiring that arrears and shelter payments in excess of
the shelter maxima be made on behalf of plaintiffs and all future
intervenors in the case.155 The court found that there was a strong
likelihood that plaintiffs would prove that the shelter maxima contained in the regulations were insufficient to enable families to
bring up the children in homes, as required by the Social Services

Law. 156
The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed the court's
order and dismissed the complaint, finding that the Social Services
Law did not impose a mandatory duty on the Commissioner of Social Services to establish "adequate" shelter allowances 57 and that
the manner in which the Commissioner exercised his discretion was
unreviewable by the court.' 58 In an April 1990 unanimous decision, however, the Court of Appeals found that the Social Services
Law did impose a mandatory duty on the Commissioner to establish adequate allowances to enable children to be brought up in
homes and that "[a] schedule establishing assistance levels so low
that it forces large numbers of families with dependent children
into homelessness does not meet the statutory standard."15 9 The
153. Plaintiffs' claims were based primarily on Article 1, § 6; Article 1, § 11; and
Article 17, § 1 of the New York State Constitution; the Equal Protection and Due

Process clauses of the 14 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and § 131, § 131-a,
§ 344 and § 350 of the Social Services Law. See Verified Amended Class Action Complaint, Jiggetts v. Grinker, Index No. 40582/87 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, filed Mar.
1987).
154. Pursuant to the regulations of the New York State Department of Social Services, an applicant for ADC can receive arrears payments based on shelter costs that
exceed the shelter maxima because prior to receiving ADC the applicant could not
have been expected to obtain shelter within the applicable shelter maximum. N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, Part 352.7(g)(3) (1994).
155. Jiggetts v. Grinker, 528 N.Y.S.2d 462 (Sup. Ct. 1988), rev'd, 543 N.Y.S.2d 414
(N.Y. App. Div. 1988), rev'd, 553 N.E.2d 570 (N.Y. 1990). There are currently more
than 21,000 families receiving relief under the preliminary injunction. Interview with
Edward Iovinelli, the New York State Department of Social Services, Division of
Legal Affairs (Mar., 1995).
156. See Jiggetts, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 468. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 350 (McKinney
1992).
157. Jiggetts v. Grinker, 543 N.Y.S.2d 414, 424 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), rev'd, 553
N.E.2d 570 (N.Y. 1990).

158. Jiggetts, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
159. Jiggetts v. Grinker, 553 N.E.2d 570, 573 (N.Y. 1990).
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issue before the court was again one of justiciability--whether the
lower court could review the actions of the Commissioner. The
court recognized that the separation of powers contemplated by
New York State's form of government mandated that policy
choices, especially those involving competing priorities and limited
funds, are matters for the legislative and executive branches of government. 16° Nevertheless, the court's analysis began, and in essence ended, with the statute's language, finding that the words of
Social Services Law § 350(1)(a)--"Allowances shall be adequate"-imported "duty, not discretion."'1 61 The court concluded that when
the legislature used those words, it imposed a duty on the Commissioner to establish a schedule reasonably calculated to achieve that
goal.' 62 The court then made clear that the legislature could
choose not to appropriate the funds necessary to finance the schedule, but found that the Commissioner would not discharge 63his statutory duty unless he promulgated an adequate schedule.
In 1991, on remand after the Court of Appeals decision, the case
went to trial. Plaintiffs produced numerous witnesses, including experts on housing availability and the housing markets, and introduced voluminous documentary evidence in an attempt to prove
their claims.' 6" The defendant Commissioner's witnesses described
in detail the processes for promulgating the regulations of the New
York State Department of Social Services, developing the executive's budget proposals and adopting the state budget by the legislature.1 65 Introducing equally voluminous documentary evidence
supported by expert testimony, the Commissioner attempted to
prove that the shelter schedule was adequate. 66 He explained that
in the process of enacting the state's budget, as jointly developed
by the executive and the legislature, the legislature clearly understood that it was appropriating funds sufficient .only to finance the
160. Id. at 572 ("Broad policy choices, which involve the ordering of priorities and
the allocation of finite resources, are matters for the executive and legislative
branches of government and the place to question their wisdom lies not in the courts
but elsewhere.").
161. Id at 573.
162. kd
163. Id at 575 ("[W]hen the Legislature directed that shelter allowances 'shall be
adequate', it imposed a duty on the Commissioner to establish a schedule reasonably
calculated for that purpose. Manifestly, the Legislature may or may not appropriate
funds necessary to fund these obligations, but the Commissioner does not discharge

this statutory duty unless he complies with the mandate contained in Social Services
Law § 350 (1)(a).").
164. See Aft. In Support of the Plaintiff, Jiggetts (Index No. 40582/87).
165. See Aft. In Support of the Defendant, Jiggetts (Index No. 40582/87).
166. Id
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shelter schedule maxima as promulgated in the New York State
Department of Social Service regulations. 67 Therefore, the legisla1 68
ture had ratified the shelter schedule.
The Jiggetts case would appear to be one in which the rules governing the review of legislative and executive actions had been appropriately followed by the courts. However, the court has not yet
issued its decision and the preliminary injunction remains in place
even though the trial was completed and final briefs were submitted three years ago. 169 Thousands of families have intervened in
170
the case, and more than 21,000 are currently receiving relief.
This relief has taken the form of arrears payments of thousands of
dollars' 7 ' and shelter payments that exceed the regulatory monthly
maxima by several hundred dollars. Pursuant to the regulations of
the New York State Department of Social Services, a typical family
of three in New York City would receive $276 each month for shelter, if heat is included in the rent. 72 Under the preliminary injunction, that same family could receive up to $650 per month for
shelter. 173 Landlords in New York City, advertising their vacant
rental units in the newspapers, state that they will accept "Jiggetts"
payments, and applicants for assistance walk into welfare offices
asking to apply for the "Jiggetts" program.
One can speculate that the judge has been hoping that by delaying a decision in the case, she is providing the executive the chance
to propose, and the legislature the chance to enact, a shelter grant
increase. Each year since litigation began, the legislature has considered and rejected enacting a statute to place the shelter schedule
167. Id.

168. Id
169. The trial was completed in July 1991, and post-trial briefs were submitted to
the court in January, 1992.
170. In SFY 1993-94, the costs of implementing the preliminary relief ordered by
the trial court totaled $55 million, with a state share of $13.8 million, a federal share of
$27.5 million, and a local share (NYC) of $13.8 million. Information provided by
Elizabeth Lassi of the Department of Social Services, Office of Budget Management.
171. See, e.g., Jiggetts v. Perales, 609 N.Y.S.2d 222 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). One

family received a payment of over $12,000 for back rent owed to their landlord.
172. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, Part 352.3(a) (1994).
173. Under the preliminary injunction, payments to intervening plaintiffs are approved on a case by case basis, and the New York State Department of Social Services
has established guidelines, agreed to by plaintiffs and the court, that place outside
limits on the amount of arrears and shelter costs that will be approved for payment.
The maximum arrears payment under these guidelines has been $7,000 and the maximum rent for a typical family has been $650. But see Jiggetts v. Perales, 609 N.Y.S.2d
222 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (approving arrears payment of $12,000).
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into section 131 of the Social Services Law. 174 At the time of the

commencement of the action, then-Governor Cuomo had proposed a shelter grant increase, to be effective in January 1988, in
his State Fiscal Year ("SFY") 1987-88 Executive Budget. 75 In addition, in the budget that was enacted that year, the legislature appropriated the funds necessary to finance the increase. 76
However, each year since then the legislature has considered, and
rejected, additional increases in funding for the shelter component

of the welfare grant. In his Executive Budget for SFY 1995-96,
Governor George Pataki proposed decreasing the non-shelter portion of the average ADC grant by 15% and, after three months, the
non-shelter portion of the average Home Relief grant for "employ-

able" recipients by 25%, and placing the shelter schedule in a statute. 177 In light of the refusal of the legislature to enact even

modest funding increases for the shelter portion of the welfare
grant, it seems inconceivable that it would appropriate the funds

necessary. to finance shelter costs and arrears payments at the
levels necessary to comply with the court's orders.
For years the existence of the court-imposed preliminary relief
has permitted each participant in the litigation and governmental
authorities to shirk their responsibilities. The plaintiffs and intervenors have not had to seek more suitable or lower-cost housing or
develop alternative strategies for meeting their shelter costs. As a
174. The author attended many budget negotiations and bases this statement upon
her personal recollections of those proceedings. If the shelter schedule were placed
into statute by the Legislature, the Jiggets case would be moot. The Court of Appeals'
decision only addressed the obligation of the Commissioner to promulgate an adequate shelter schedule in regulation. If the Legislature enacted a statute embodying
the schedule, whether adequate or not, it would be clearly beyond the courts' power
to review; Article 17, § 1 of the N.Y. Constitution states that the aid, care and support
of the needy shall be determined by the Legislature and the cases have held that the
adequacy of these benefits set by the Legislature is outside the courts' jurisdiction.
Thus, the Department of Social Services argued that by appropriating only enough
money to fund the schedule at its present levels, the Legislature had, in fact, ratified
the regulatory schedule. The courts cannot order the Legislature to appropriate
money and Article 17 clearly makes the determination of the adequacy of benefits a
legislative perogative.
175. Governor Mario M. Cuomo, Governor's Message to the Legislature (Jan. 7,
1987), in New York State Legislative Annual (1987), at 42 (proposing a 22% increase
in shelter allowance ceilings for public assistance recipients).
176. Memorandum from John C. Cochrane, Ranking Minority Member, New York
State Assembly Ways and Means Committee, to Republican Members of the Assembly 80 (April 20, 1987) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal) (noting legislative approval of an "average statewide increase of 22% in public assistance shelter
allowance ceilings" as part of the 1987-88 aid to localities budget).
177. See supra, note 174 and accompanying text; see also Executive Budget for SFY
1995-96; proposed amendment to Budget Bill, S. 1826/A. 3126 (Mar. 6, 1995).
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result of the court's orders, many clients who mismanage their
grants, fail to pay their rents and accrue large arrears are rewarded
by receiving duplicate payments. In addition, they are being permitted to remain in housing that they cannot really afford. Other
clients who manage to make ends meet receive no additional assist-,
ance. The court's orders, by permitting clients to remain housed,
have decreased pressure on the executive branch to propose a significant increase in the shelter portion of the welfare grant, a rental
subsidy program to assist welfare recipients and other low-income
people, or the building of more low income housing-proposals
that would be unpopular with taxpayers who are clamoring for
lower taxes and appear to be retreating from their traditional desire to assist the needy. The court's orders have also resulted in the
expenditure of millions of dollars that, with appropriate planning
and deliberation by the executive branch, might have been allocated more rationally among the caseload of welfare recipients.
The legislature's prerogatives of deciding whether to appropriate
funds and how to allocate appropriated funds has been usurped,
because the funds necessary to finance the court-imposed shelter
amounts are automatically available since ADC is an entitlement
program. The legislature has also been able to avoid making the
same politically sensitive choices as the executive.
The implications for the more than 21,000 families receiving
"Jiggetts" relief are staggering: most of these families have been
living for years in apartments and houses throughout New York
City that they could not afford absent the court-imposed relief. It
would be cruel irony indeed if, when their "temporary" relief ends,
their shelter payments are reduced to the levels authorized by statute or regulation, making them unable to meet their shelter costs,
leading to eviction from their homes, thus exacerbating the already
significant problems of homelessness among families.
D.

Community Service Society v. Cuomo; Greater New York
Hospital Association v. Perales

In May 1989, the New York State Department of Social Services
proposed regulations 78 to establish a new system of controlling
utilization of services under the Medical Assistance program. 179
178. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, SCS-22-89-00010-P, fied May 16, 1989.

179. New York State's Medical Assistance Program, commonly referred to as the
Medicaid program, is a comprehensive program that provides medically necessary
care, services and supplies to the needy in New York State. The program is one of the
most comprehensive health care programs for the needy in the nation. New York
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The Medicaid Utilization Threshold System ("MUTS") was intended to curb overutilization and inappropriate utilization of care
80
and services by recipients and to combat fraud by providers.1
The New York State Department of Social Services also estimated
that implementation of MUTS would save New York State approximately $31 million in SFY 1989-90.111 The proposed regulations
established a system requiring prior authorization for medical care,
services and supplies provided to recipients in excess of the level of

such services required by the majority of Medicaid recipients. Different thresholds were proposed for different kinds of services, 82
with the thresholds being set at the service utilization levels of between 92 percent and 99 percent of the eligible recipients. 83 Procedures were proposed to deal with the needs of some recipients
for additional services, including permitting applications for increases in thresholds and permitting additional services to be pro-

vided for recipients with urgent or emergency needs for services.' 84
In August 1989, prior to the adoption of the proposed regulatory
amendments and while they were still subject to public comment, a

lawsuit challenging the regulations was filed on behalf of a group of
recipients, taxpayers and not-for profit organizations against the
Governor of New York State and the Commissioner of Social Services. 185 In September 1989, a second lawsuit was filed against the

Commissioner, challenging the regulations on behalf of a group of

State has elected to cover under its program most of the optional services authorized
under the federal program, as well as providing a complete range of services to the
"categorically needy" (persons eligible for federally funded Medicaid by %virtueof
their receipt of other categories of assistance such as ADC), the "medically needy"
(persons who would be eligible for federally funded Medicaid but for the fact that
they possess too much income or too many resources) and all recipients under the
Home Relief program (New York State's general assistance program). N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW, §§ 363-369 (McKinney 1992).
180. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Regulatory Impact Statement, § 3; Notice of
Adoption, Number SCS-22-89-0010-A, Revised Regulatory Impact Statement, § 3.
181. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Regulatory Impact Statement, § 4. This estimate of savings was revised to $24.5 million state share in SFY 1989-90 in the Notice
of Adoption, Number SCS-22-89-0010-A, Revised Regulatory Impact Statement, § 4.
182. For example, 14 visits to physicians or clinics, the filling of 60 prescriptions for
drugs, 18 laboratory service procedures. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Regulatory
Impact Statement, Section 3; Proposed Part 503 of N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
18 (1989).
183. Affidavit of Mary Brankman dated Nov. 14, 1989, Community Serv. Soc'y v.
Cuomo, Index No. 18221/89 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989).
184. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Proposed Part 503 of N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS. tit. 18 (1989).
185. See Complaint, Community Serv. Soc'y (Index No. 18221/89).
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doctors and not-for-profit operators of hospitals and clinics.'8 6 The
lawsuits contended that the MUTS set arbitrary limits on services
that would result in recipients rationing their care and failing to
seek medically necessary treatment. They further contended that
the New York State Department of Social Services lacked the statutory authority to propose such regulations and that the proposed
regulations violated the Social Services Law and the New York
State Constitution's provisions requiring the state to care for the
needy and provide due process of law.' 87 Finally, the lawsuits asserted that the proposal violated sections of the State Administrative Procedure Act (SAPA), 8 8 and that, with regard to the
Medicaid providers, the regulatory impact statement underestimated the costs associated with the implementation of the
program. 8 9
Subsequent to the filing of the complaints, the New York State
Department of Social Services adopted the regulations, after making several modifications to the program in response to the comments received during the public comment period. 90 These
modifications included excluding certain services from MUTS, 191

permitting recipients to apply for exemptions from and increases in
thresholds, 9 z decreasing the maximum time permitted for the New
York State Department of Social Services to take action on an application for an exemption or increase, after which the application
would be deemed approved, 93 and providing for additional services to be provided while an application for exemption or increase
was pending. 94 Modifications were also made to the procedures
for requesting "fair hearings" to challenge actions taken by the
New York State Department of Social Services in connection with
95
MUTS.

1

186. Greater New York Hosp. Ass'n v. Perales, Index Number 21148/89 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1989).
187. Id.
188. N.Y. A.P.A. §§ 101-501 (McKinney 1984).
189. Complaint at 25-36, Community Serv. Soc'y (Index No. 18221/89); Complaint
at 10-19, Greater New York Hosp. Ass'n (Index No. 21148/89).
190. Notice of Adoption, No. SCS-22-89-0010-A, filed Aug. 24, 1989.
191. For example, mental health services and pediatric services, including pediatric
dental services, in addition to the previously proposed exclusion of services under the
Child/Teen Health program. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, Part 503.4 (1989).
192. The proposed regulations only permitted providers to apply for exemptions
from and increases in thresholds on behalf of recipients. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 18 §§ 503.7, 503.8 (1989),
193. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, Part 503.11 (1989).
194. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, Part 503.10 (1989).
195. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, Part 503.12 (1989).
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In November 1989, the court issued preliminary injunctions in
each of the cases, enjoining the New York State Department of
Social Services from implementing MUTS, notwithstanding the
modifications that had been made to the program to address the
criticisms of plaintiffs and other public comments on the proposed
regulations. 196 The court found that there was a strong likelihood
that plaintiffs would succeed in proving their statutory claims that
there was no statutory authority for MUTS, 9 7 that the plaintiffs
had demonstrated irreparable harm, 98 and that the balancing of
the equities favored maintaining the status quo. 199 In granting the
injunction, the court evaluated the New York State Department of
Social Services' estimates of savings, but rather than giving deference to its expertise in developing such estimates for the Medicaid
program, gave great weight to plaintiffs' experts, who challenged
the estimates.2 °° The court also made its own estimation as to the
value of the savings. 20 1 The court also refused to defer to the
agency's analysis of alternatives 20 2 to MUTS and again engaged in
its own review of alternatives.20 3
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, upheld the
preliminary injunctions, finding that the lower court had not
abused its discretion. 20 4 The court found no specific statutory authority permitting implementation of MUTS, and that sufficient
questions had been raised as to whether the Social Services Law
provisions governing the Medicaid program would support its im-

196. Order, Fingerhood, J., Nov. 9, 1989, Community Serv. Soc'y (Index No. 18221/
89); Order, Fingerhood, J., Nov. 15, 1989, New York Hosp. Ass'n (Index No. 21148/
89).

197. Order, Fimgerhood, J., Nov. 9, 1989 at 13-17, Community Serv. Soc'y (Index
No. 18221/89); Order, Fingerhood, J., Nov. 15, 1989 at 2-4, New York Hosp. Ass'n
(Index No. 21148/89).

198. Order, Fmgerhood, J., Nov. 9, 1989 at 17-19, Community Serv. Soc'y (Index
No. 18221/89); Order, F'mgerhood, J., Nov. 15, 1989 at 2-4, New York Hosp. Ass'n
(Index No. 21148/89).

199. Order, F'mgerhood, J., Nov. 9, 1989 at 19-20, Community Serv. Soc'y (Index
No. 18221/89); Order, Fingerhood, J., Nov. 15, 1989 at 2-4, New York Hosp. Ass'n
(Index No. 21148/89).
200. Order F'mgerhood, J., Nov. 9, 1989 at 11, Community Serv. Soc'y (Index No.
18221/89).

201. Id. at 11-12.
202. Id. at 12.
203. Id. at 9-13.
204. Community Serv. Soc'y v. Cuomo, 561 N.Y.S.2d 461, 465 (N.Y. App. Div.

1990).
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plementation.2 °5 The court concluded that the lower court's order
properly maintained the status quo. 2° 6
The MUTS had been carefully developed by the New York State
Department of Social Services, using the vast amounts of information about Medicaid utilization contained in its information systems.2 °7 The proposed thresholds were set at extremely high
percentiles (92% - 99%) to avoid adversely affecting usual and legitimate patterns of recipient service usage.20 8 In addition to seeking cost savings, the New York State Department of Social Services
was seeking to intercede where it detected patterns of overuse or
misuse of services, in order to ensure that recipients were receiving
the highest quality medical care, as required by the Social Services
Law.20 9 Protections for recipients were included in the program to
ensure that legitimate needs for additional services were met. Procedural protections were a part of the program, including a series
of notices, appeals, fair hearings and judicial review. 210 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to SAPA, 21 and as required,
modifications were made in response to legitimate concerns raised
during the public comment period. 212 Despite all these safeguards,
the courts still enjoined implementation of the program, however,
uncritically accepting plaintiffs allegations of harm213 and ignoring
the inherent authority of the Commissioner of Social Services, pursuant to the Social Services Law, to administer the Medicaid program, promulgate regulations necessary for its proper
administration, and determine what constitutes medically neces214
sary care, services and supplies.
As a result of the preliminary injunctions, implementation of
MUTS was halted and New York lost savings of approximately $45
205. Id.
206. Id
207. The Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS) and its Surveillance

and Utilization Review Subsystem (SURS) provide the New York State Department
of Social Services with detailed and voluminous data on all aspects of utilization of

services in the Medicaid program. N.Y. Soc. SERV.

LAW

§ 367-b (McKinney 1992).

208. Id.

209. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 363 (McKinney 1992).
210. Submissions of New York State Department of Social Services including affidavit of Mary Brankman, dated Nov. 14, 1989, Community Serv. Soc'y (Index No.
18221/89).

211. See supra, note 188.
212. Submissions of New York State Department of Social Services, including affidavit of Mary Brankman, dated Nov. 14, 1989, Community Serv. Soc'y (Index No.
18221/89).

213. Complaint at 22-25, Community Serv. Soc'y (Index No. 18221/89).
214. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW, §§ 17, 20, 34, 363, 365 (McKinney 1992).
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million.215 Subsequently, the Legislature enacted statutes that ex-

pressly authorized the implementation of MUTS, at first for adults
who were eligible for Medicaid by virtue of their eligibility for

Home Relief2 16 and later for all Medicaid recipients. 17 The New
York State Department of Social Services promulgated regulations
21 9
governing the program2 18 pursuant to specific statutory authority
and the program is in operation today.220 Gross savings attributa-

ble to the program total $60 million annually, with a State share of
approximately $30 million, as originally projected by the New York

State Department of Social Services. None of the horrors anticipated by plaintiffs came to pass. There are approximately 2.7 million Medicaid recipients each year, and since the beginning of the
program between 96 and 99 percent of all requested exemptions

and increases in thresholds were granted. Those that have been
denied were rejected because the applications contained incomplete or incorrect information. No application has been denied for
lack of medical necessity. There are approximately twelve requests

for fair hearings concerning utilization thresholds each year, and

there has been no related litigation. 2
The savings from the program's implementation were delayed
for more than a year.22 2 In that time, the! executive was forced to
propose and the legislature was forced to enact a series of more
drastic limitations on services and eligibility restrictions. These
limitations and restrictions have included a reduction in the Medicaid benefit package available to Home Relief recipients,223 the requirement that certain Medicaid recipients contribute financially to
215. Implementation of MUTS was delayed for approximately one and one half
years for Home Relief Medicaid recipients and almost two years for other Medicaid
recipients. With annual savings of $30 million attributable to MUTS, a one and one
half year delay resulted in lost savings of approximately $45 million. Information
provided by James Donnelly, the New York State Department of Social Services, Division of Health and Long Term Care (Mar., 1995).
216. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 365-g (McKinney 1992), added by Chapter 938 of the
Laws of 1990, effective January 1, 1991.
217. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 365-g (McKinney 1992), as amended by Chapter 165 of
the Laws of 1991, effective June 12, 1991.
218. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, Part 503 (1989)
219. Act of June 12, 1991, ch. 165, 1991 N.Y. Laws 210.
220. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. fit. 18, Part 511 (1993).
221. Information provided by Mark Sullivan, former Budget Director of the New
York State Department of Social Services, Office of Budget Management, and Russell
Hanks, Deputy General Counsel for Administrative Hearings, the New York State
Department of Social Services, Division of Legal Affairs (Mar. 1995).
222. See text accompanying footnote 215.
223. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW, § 365-a(8) (McKinney 1992), as added by § 62 of Chapter 41 of the Laws of 1992.
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the costs of their care by payment of a "co-payment" amount,z2
the requirement that a fiscal assessment tool be used to evaluate
the costs of recipients' home health care and personal care services,225 and thr
the requirement of the use of a home care assessment
instrument to evaluate recipients' need for home care and personal

care services. 2 26 It is more than mere speculation to suggest that if
MUTS had been implemented when first proposed and the projected savings of $30 million annually realized, some of the other
service limitations and eligibility restrictions which have had a direct impact on the plaintiffs in these cases would not have been
necessary. The new limitations on services and eligibility restrictions have each been challenged in litigation2 27 and, in most of the

cases, preliminary injunctions have again enjoined implementation
of the policies developed and enacted by the legislature and the
executive. Additional fiscal savings have been lost, leading to additional proposed reductions in services and benefits.228 This cycle of
litigation and budget cutting will presumably continue as the legis-

lature and the executive struggle to contain health care costs and
advocates resist their efforts.
E.

Wilder v. Bernstein

In 1973, the American Civil Liberties Union, representing a class

of black Protestant foster children 229 challenged the foster care

224. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 367-a(6) (McKinney 1992), as added by § 91 of Chapter 41 of the Laws of 1992.
225. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW, § 367-j, k (McKinney 1992), as added by §§ 22 and 23 of
Chapter 165 of the Laws of 1991.
226. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW, § 367-o (McKinney 1992), as added by § 78 of Chapter
41 of the Laws of 1992.
227. Burland v. Dowling, Index No. 407324/93 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1992) and
Catanzano v. Dowling, Civ. Action No. 89-1127L (U.S.D.C., W.D.N.Y. 1989) (challenges to fiscal assessment tools); Dowd v. Bane, Index No. 17335/92 (Sup. Ct., N.Y.
County 1992), Home Care Council of New York City v. Bane, Index No. 17508/92
(Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1992), Home Care Ass'n of New York v. Bane, Index No.
7151/92 (Sup. Ct., Alb. County 1992) (challenges to home care assessment tool); McCall v. Bane, Index No. 17344/92 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1992) (challenge to reduction
in Home Relief Medicaid benefit package); Sweeney v. Bane, Civ. Action Number
92-2528 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd., 996 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1993) (challenge to co-pay-

ments; denial of preliminary injunction).
228. In his Executive budget proposal for SFY 1995-96, Governor George Pataki
has proposed additional cuts in private duty nursing services, audiology, dental care
and physical therapy for adults. He has also proposed additional restrictions on eligibility for home health care and personal care services.
229. The defendants were various New York State and New York City child welfare
officials, including the Commissioners of Social Services and officials of various Catholic and Jewish child care agencies.
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placement 230 policies of New York State and New York City, alleg-

ing that the foster care system's traditional reliance on religiously
affiliated agencies to provide foster care services and the practice
of "religious matching '' 231 of foster children and agencies was un-

constitutional. 32 The plaintiffs alleged racial and religious discrimination, and violations of the constitutional ban on the
establishment of religion. 23 3 A three-judge Federal court examined
New York's constitutional 'and statutory scheme under the stan-

dards developed by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating claimed
violations of the First Amendment's religion clauses.23 4 The court

determined that while the scheme, especially the use and funding
of religiously affiliated foster care agencies, appeared to violate the
literal wording of the Establishment Clause, the rights of foster
children to the free exercise of their religious preferences saved
New York State's policies from facially violating the U.S. Constitu-

tion. 35 The court found that New York State's policies represented a reasonable accommodation between the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.236
Subsequently, a second action was filed 237 and the trial court
granted class certification.238 The complaint was amended several

230. In New York State, a child can enter foster care "voluntarily" pursuant to N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-a (McKinney 1992) or "involuntarily" pursuant to Art. 10 of
the N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr §§ 1011-1074 (McKinney 1983).
231. The New York State Constitution requires that, when practicable, a foster
child must be placed in a facility governed by or in the custody of a person of the
same religion as the child. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 32. The Social Services Law also
provided that a child should, when practicable, be placed with an agency under the
control of persons of the same religion and that placements must, consistent with the
child's best interests, give effect to the religious preference of the child's parent. N.Y.
SoC. SERV. LAW § 373 (McKinney 1992).
232. Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013, 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) [hereinafter Wilder I].
233. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 1018.
234. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
235. Wilder 1, 385 F. Supp. at 1024.
236. Id. at 1029.
237. Parker v. Bernstein, 78 Civ. 957 (RJW) (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
238. Wilder I was dismissed by the court with the understanding that the court in
Parker v. Bernstein would treat Wilder I as stare decisis. The case was renamed Wilder v. Bernstein [hereinafter Wilder II]. The court's class certification order also dismissed several of plaintiffs' facial challenges to other New York State and City
statutes not considered in Wilder I but that the court considered to be inherently part
of the statutory scheme challenged in Wilder I. Wilder H,499 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
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times, 239 and as the parties prepared for trial, the plaintiffs' main

claims continued to be that the foster care system operated in a
racially discriminatory manner toward black children, who were
placed in agencies that provided poorer quality care; 240 that the
foster care system discriminated on the basis of religion, because
Catholic and Jewish foster care agencies were permitted to give
preference to children of their own religions; 241 that the foster care
system violated the Establishment Clause because it provided government financing to pervasively religious entities and excessively
entangled government with religion;242 and that the foster care system impermissibly burdened the free exercise of religion by Protestant children.243
Prior to trial, the plaintiffs and the City of New York negotiated
a proposed settlement and presented it to the court. The court
held hearings before approving the settlement, in order to give affected parties, including the child care agencies, the opportunity to
object to the proposed settlement. 2 " Modifications were made to
the proposal to address various concerns raised, and the Stipulation of Settlement 245 was signed and presented to the court for final
approval in December 1985.
Without any admission of wrongdoing, 246 the Stipulation 247 es-

tablished an elaborate classification system, by which an independent consultant would rate the quality of all foster care agencies and
rank them accordingly. 2 " The assignment of children to the care
of foster care agencies 249 would be on a "first come, first served"
basis, and the expression of a religious preference would not give a
child greater access to the best available program than other children for whom the program was appropriate. 250 There would be

239. A fourth amended complaint was filed in April 1983. Wilder II, 645 F. Supp.
1292, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd 848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988).
240. Fourth Amended Complaint 911
49-74, Wilder II, No. 78 Civ. 957 (RJW)
(S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 27, 1983). The Complaint also alleged violations of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1 223.
243. Id. at 11 68-69, 225.
244. Hearings were held during the August 1984 and March 1985.
245. Proposed Stipulation of Settlement dated Aug. 27, 1985, Wilder II (No. 78 Civ.
957 (RJW)) [hereinafter Wilder II Stipulation].
246. Id. at 1 2.
247. The Stipulation is extremely detailed, covering every aspect of New York
City's foster care placement system, and comprising 84 paragraphs.
248. Wilder II Stipulation, supra note 245, at 11 6-17.
249. Id. at 11 18 - 55.
250. Id. at 9119 - 20.

1995]

LITIGATIONAL SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY

1045

recognition that for compelling therapeutic reasons exceptions to
the "first come, first served" policy would be permitted, 25 ' and certain special agencies would be designated to care for children
whose religious tenets required that their upbringing be guided by
adherents of their own religions. 252 Parents would be permitted to
make their preferences known, 253 and, if an "in-religion" placement were not immediately available, parents would be given the
option of having their children wait for the "best in-religion program," placed in the "next best in-religion program,"
or placed in
25 4
program.
out-of-religion
available
the "best
Several Catholic and Jewish child care agencies continued to object to the Stipulation. The court, in an extensive opinion,255 analyzed each of the objections, evaluated the Stipulation against the
applicable constitutional principles, and approved it, finding that it
was legal, fairly resolved plaintiffs' claims without prejudicing the
interests of other participants in the foster care system, and furthered the legal objectives of the underlying lawsuit.256 Endorsing
the "thoroughness, craftsmanship, scholarship and sensitivity to the
issues presented" of the lower court opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.25 7
The classification system contemplated by the Stipulation has
still not been fully implemented, and, because its implementation is
the trigger for activating the "sunset" clause,258 the case is still
pending, twenty two years after its initiation. In that time, there
have been significant changes in the child welfare system. After
years of decreasing numbers of children entering foster care, an
increased focus on the prevention of child abuse and maltreatment,
the AIDS epidemic and the widespread use of "crack" cocaine in
the 1980s caused the number of children entering foster care to
skyrocket. 25 9 As a result of changes in child welfare policy and
251. Id at

21, 32 - 43.

252. Id. at 1 61.
253. Id. at 11 56 - 60.
254. Id. at 1 23.
255. Wilder H, 645 F. Supp. 1292. The opinion issued by the court was 118 pages
long. The court entered final judgment after plaintiffs met certain court-imposed conditions. Order, Ward, J., Feb. 19, 1987, Wilder H (No. 78 Civ. 957).

256. Wilder H, 645 F. Supp. at 1354.
257. Wilder v. Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338, 1341 (2d Cir. 1988).
258. The Stipulation was to terminate three years after full implementation or five
years after entry of the Stipulation, with various options for extension. Wilder H Stipulation, supra note 245, at 191 79-81.
259. Between 1978 and 1985, the number of children in out-of-home care in New

York State declined by 29%. In 1986, there were approximately 28,000 children in
foster care. By 1988, there were almost 46,000 children in foster care and by 1992,
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practice-an increased emphasis on keeping troubled families together260 and, where foster care is necessary, a focus on the placement of children with their own relatives, rather than with
strangers261 -the foster care system has changed radically. New
York State has initiated a variety of projects to explore alternatives
to traditional foster care. The Home ReBuilders initiative encour-

ages foster care agencies to move children out of foster care and
into permanent homes more quickly by changing the way agencies

receive funding. 262 The use of "resource families"-relatives or
there were almost 63,000 children in foster care in New York State. Almost 75% of
these children were from New York City. NEW YORK STATE KIDS COUNT 1994
DATA BOOK 44 (Apr. 1994). There are currently more than 60,000 children in foster
care in New York State. N.Y.S. DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERV., IMPROVING SERVICES TO
FAMILIES AND CHILDREN (1994); Information provided by James Purcell, Assoc.
Comm. of the Office of Children and Family Services, the New York State Department of Social Services, Division of Services and Community Development (July,
1994).
260. Among the initiatives focusing on family preservation is a new federal funding
stream. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, P.L. 103-66 tit. 13, §§ 13711-16,
107 Stat. 312, 649-58.
261. In Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the
same level of funding must be provided to children placed in foster care with relatives
as those placed with strangers. In 1986, a group of foster children in care with relatives in New York City sued officials of New York City and the New York State Department of Social Services to obtain the same care and services provided to children
in placement with non-relatives. Eugene F. v. Gross, Index No. 1125/86 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1986). In November 1985, the New York State Department of Social
Services promulgated regulations governing the use of relatives as foster parents.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18 Parts 443 and 444 (1985). In October, 1986,
the New York State Department of Social Services issued an Administrative Directive, 86 ADM-33, that advised all social services officials in New York State of new
procedures for the use of relatives as foster care placements ("kinship" foster care).
In 1990, the legislature indicated its preference for placement of children with relatives. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-a (1) (McKinney 1992). See also FAM. CT. ACT
§ 1017 (1983). In 1992, another issuance of the New York State Department of Social
Services, 92 LCM-27, provided social services officials with additional information on
the use of relatives as resources for children. At least one court has found that children have a constitutional right to be placed with relatives. Lipscomb v. Simmons,
884 F. 2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1989). There are currently more than 20,000 children across
New York State in placements with relatives. N.Y.S. DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERV., IMPROVING SERVICES TO FAMILIES AND CHILDREN (1994); Information also provided
by James Purcell, Assoc. Comm. of the Office of Children and Family Services, the
New York State Department of Social Services, Division of Services and Community
Development (July, 1994).
262. Traditionally, foster care agencies received a daily "per diem" rate for each
child in their care. Agencies received more money for caring for children who remained in care for longer periods of time. Home ReBuilders uses capitated rates,
whereby agencies receive a fixed amount for each child in their care, regardless of
how long the child remains in care. It is hoped that this rate structure, similar to the
way medical "managed care" providers are reimbursed will encourage agencies to
move children to permanency more quickly. For a fuller discussion of Home Re-
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families from children's own communities-to provide a wide
range of assistance to troubled families is being explored. These
families will be expected to provide respite to parents and mentoring to children and, when out-of-home placement is necessary for a
period of time, will care for the children in their own communities,
maintaining close ties with the children's own families. It is hoped
that some of these resource families will become adoptive families,
if children cannot be reunited with their own families.263
These new initiatives make clear that if the concept of "first
come, first served" ever really had any validity as a way of determining foster care placements for children, it no longer does so.
Yet, despite all of these changes to the foster care system, in 1993,
the plaintiffs in Wilder moved to hold the New York City defendants in contempt 264 for failing, among other things, to apply the
Stipulation's provisions to kinship foster care placements.265 Interpreting the Stipulation, the Judge determined that it did apply to
kinship placements,266 and, in a recent decision, that ruling was, in
effect, affirmed, although the appeal was dismissed and the case
was remanded to give the city defendants the opportunity to seek
modification of the Stipulation to exclude kinship placements.267
In light of the changes to the child welfare system described above,
in light of the legislature's expressed preference for placement of
children with relatives, and in light of the inherent illogic of using a
"first come, first served" placement system to deal with children
going to the homes of family members, the court should exclude
kinship foster care placements from the ambit of the Stipulation.
Conclusion
The cases described above illustrate that although some very significant benefits have accrued to the clients served by the social
services system through the use of litigation, it is far from an ideal
IV.

Builders, see N.Y.S. DEP'T. OF SOCIAL SERV., IMPROVING SERVICES
CHILDREN (1994); and FAMILIES FOR KIDS ASAP (1994).

TO FAMILIES AND

263. Id
264. Wilder v. Bernstein, 153 F.R.D. 524, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), appeal dismissed, 49
F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1993).

265. Id The lawyers for the plaintiffs in Eugene F. were granted permission to
intervene in Wilder for the limited purpose of arguing that kinship foster children are
not and, because it is not in their best interests, should not be subject to the terms of
the Stipulation. Order, Ward, J., Jan. 28, 1994, Wilder II (No. 78 Civ. 957 (RJW)). In
response to the contempt motion, the New York City defendants contended that the
Stipulation was never intended to apply to kinship foster care.
266. Wilder v. Bernstein, 153 F.R.D. at 528.

267. 49 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1995) (appeal dismissed).
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way to make public policy. The intrusion of the courts into the
policy-making arena reserved for the legislature and the executive
branch prevents those entities from developing policies in a reasoned, deliberative manner, and, even when they have done so,
substitutes courts' and advocates' views of policy for those of the
persons and entities, chosen by the voters, to whom the New York
State Constitution commits the responsibility for policy
development.
The energies and talents of executive officials are diverted from
the planning and development of appropriate policies, and are devoted to responding to complaints, motions and court orders.
Funds that could be used to implement sound policies are used to
respond to court-imposed mandates and, on occasion, fines. The
courts are, in effect, requiring the appropriation of funds by the
legislature, because sufficient funding must be budgeted to respond
to court imposed solutions. 68 Court mandates are responsive only
to the immediate crises that precipitated the litigation, and do not
take into account the competing, and equally compelling, broader
issues and needs that must also be addressed. While the views of
advocates and judges may be interesting and insightful, litigation
should not be used to impose them upon or substitute them for the
policies of the legislature and executive.
Courts should be mindful of their appropriate role and not exceed it. Our jurisprudence correctly delineates that role, and the
reasons for the judiciary to avoid intruding on the prerogatives of
the other branches of government are equally valid today as when
those principles were developed. Courts are not equipped to make
choices between competing policies and demands for funding.
With taxpayers demanding tax cuts and the Congress and the legislature responding to those demands, the pool of money to be divided among various needs is finite and decreasing. Hard choices
must be made and courts lack the expertise and political judgment
to make them. The courts should focus on deciding the merits of
underlying claims, and issuing final and truly equitable relief,
rather than permitting preliminary injunctions, with plaintiffs'
claims taken at face value, effectively to decide the course of public
policy.

268. Each year, in its budget submission to the legislature, the executive requests,
an appropriation for "Jiggetts" relief. See; e.g., Executive Budget, SFY 1993-94. The
City of New York is required to include in its budget request to the New York City
Council sufficient funds to pay the fines ordered by the court in McCain.
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Most importantly, litigation can sometimes have unintended results that actually harm the interests of the people it seeks to protect. The homeless men and women who are represented in
Callahanwould have been better served by the careful and rational
development of housing with services programs that meet their
needs. The millions of dollars spent on improving conditions in
armories are only in recent years being redirected to developing, in
consultation with advocates for the homeless and service providers,
more appropriate types of housing. 69 The families receiving "Jiggetts" relief have been encouraged to rely upon a safety net that
will probably be pulled from beneath them in the near future.
Home Relief recipients would be better off today if the kind of
Medicaid services to which they are entitled had not been reduced
as a result of the delay in implementation of MUTS. The ability to
have 200, perhaps medically contraindicated, drug prescriptions filled each year is a poor substitute for the eye care that some of
them no longer receive and the shorter hospital stays for which
they are eligible. The children entering foster care because their
parents abuse drugs or are dying from AIDS would be better
served if they are permitted to live with relatives and family friends
in their own communities. Being assigned to the supervision of
foster care agencies on a "first come, first served" basis, relying
upon a twenty year-old vision of what the foster care system looks
like, is the height of absurdity.
Advocates must work to develop access to policy-makers, including members of the legislature and executive agency officials, so
that their views can be heard in a calm, non-adversarial, and nonconfrontational manner. Bringing problems to the attention of
agency officials before litigation is necessary, and will often result
in policy changes that provide as much or more relief to clients
than court orders ever can.27° Threats of litigation cause doors to
269. The Tunes Square Hotel, once a notorious example of the worst the system
had to offer, is now a model of housing with available social services, serving formerly
homeless persons, persons with mental illnesses, persons with HIV infection and
AIDS and low income persons from the surrounding community. The project was
developed collaboratively by advocates for the homeless, social services providers,
and various officials of New York City and New York State government agencies,
with a mixture of federal, state, city and private funding.
270. For more than 10 years, the Division of Legal Affairs of the New York State
Department of Social Services has had a Legal Services Advisory Committee. The
Committee, comprising legal services lawyers from around New York State, brings
various ideas for policy development and problems to the attention of the General
Counsel and legal staff of the agency. As a result of the free exchange of ideas that

the Committee encourages, regulations have been amended and, where necessary,
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be closed; offers to work collaboratively on policy development can
open ears and minds. When litigation is necessary, advocates must
choose their cases wisely and plan strategically to avoid consequences that actually harm clients. This is especially important as
political developments threaten to curtail radically the social services system. Litigation should be used to protect and establish fundamental rights, but change and policy experimentation that does
not threaten those rights should be permitted to take place
unimpeded.

developed; policies of local social services agencies that violated state policy have
been halted; new policies and programs have been implemented in ways that-are
more sensitive to clients needs; and litigation has been avoided.

